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Nonbank providers of payment services are important in the United States and 
appear to have become more prominent in recent years. This development, by 
itself, poses unique risks to the payments system. Associated with this change is a 
significant transformation in the mix of payment types away from checks and 
towards electronic payments, which introduces new risks to the payments system 
and potentially compounds the risks posed by increased reliance on nonbank 
providers of payment services. This paper reviews these recent developments in 
the retail payments system, discusses the associated risks, and  presents an 
overview of the supervision of nonbank providers of payment services. Policies 
aimed at controlling risk in the retail payments system  need to better address an 
increasing level of information asymmetries, externalities, and coordination 
problems. Policy tools such as standards setting,  disclosure,  clarifying legal 
responsibilities, and supervision  can  each play a role in improving control of 
payments system risk. To guide policy reforms, it would be useful to collect more 
information on the sources, extent and cost of disruptions to payment systems 
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I. Introduction 
The retail payments system in the United States has undergone significant change in 
recent years. There has been an increasing reliance on electronic networks and changes in the 
industrial structure of providers of payment services. The mix of payment types has moved 
towards electronic forms of payment and away from checks. In general these changes have been 
good for consumers and merchants because consumers have more choice, merchants have more 
options, and the payments system is more efficient.  
One aspect of the evolving payments system that has attracted attention is its ownership 
structure. Nonbanks are pervasive in payments processing and dominate certain key sections of 
payments work flow such as merchant acquiring. Some evidence suggests a trend towards more 
of the payments system being operated by nonbank firms, as in electronic funds transfer (EFT) 
switching. Thus responsibility for operating the payments system relies less on banking 
institutions today than in the past.  
Along with those changes has come a steady stream of stories about errors and 
disruptions in the payments system. Many of these involve security breaches or fraud, such as 
unauthorized automated clearinghouse (ACH) transfers, viruses disabling automated teller 
machine (ATM) systems, hacking of home computers to obtain account information, or stolen 
laptop computers that contain sensitive account information. Others are pure errors, such as 
improper processing of point of sale (POS) transactions or computer glitches in processing ACH 
transactions.  
The rapid pace of change raises the possibility that new risks have been introduced into 
the payments system. Risks associated with payments processing are not only different when 
they are outsourced compared to when done in house, but outsourcing can magnify difficulties in      
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controlling risk due to asymmetries in information possessed by payments participants. 
Similarly, electronic payments have a significantly different risk profile compared to checks. 
Perhaps most important, the shift to electronic payment networks implies greater levels of 
externalities and coordination difficulties. These difficulties can impede the ability of the 
payments market to attain a socially desirable level of control of payments system risk. Policy 
tools such as standards setting, disclosure and clarifying legal responsibilities help by giving 
incentive to payment providers to control risk. Potential market failure, however, suggests that 
supervision may also need to play a role in controlling payments system risk.  
In light of recent changes to the payments system it would be prudent to review the 
current supervisory structure related to nonbank payment processors. While bank regulatory 
agencies have continually revised their supervisory processes to adapt to changes in the delivery 
of information technology services, market realities may make it difficult to appropriately design 
these processes. Moreover, the original authority to supervise nonbank payment processors was 
established over 40 years ago, when the primary reason for establishing that authority was the 
use of computer technology applied to bank accounting systems. A natural question to ask is 
whether that authority is appropriate given the revolutionary changes in information processing 
technology seen over the last four decades.  
The purpose of this paper is to lay groundwork for a dialogue on policy to control risk in 
the U.S. retail payments system in light of trends in nonbank payment providers and in electronic 
payments. The next section of the paper reviews recent developments in the U.S. retail payments 
system with a focus on nonbank payment providers and changes in the mix of paper and 
electronic payments. The third section examines the types of risk introduced to payments by 
involvement of nonbank providers and by electronic payments. The fourth section provides an      
  3 
overview of the current supervisory approach to nonbank payment providers. The final section 
discusses issues relevant to payments system risk and argues that more information should be 
collected on the sources, extent and cost of disruptions to the payments system associated with 
nonbank payment providers.  
 
II. Recent developments in the U.S. payments system 
Nonbank participation in the U.S. payments system  
At the end of World War II there were essentially two choices for retail payments: cash 
and checks. Since then many new options have been added, including credit cards, ACH 
payments, ATM machines, online debit cards, offline debit cards, stored value cards, and online 
payments. These new choices have given nonbanks opportunities to service the payments 
process, and oftentimes, nonbanks have innovated new payment options.  
A recent study by Bradford, Davies, and Weiner documents the pervasiveness of 
nonbanks in the U.S. payments system.
1 They list 35 types of payment activities in three groups: 
authorization, processing, and instrument provision.
2 Banks dominate a number of categories, 
including check item processing, lockbox processing, clearinghouses, operating credit card 
networks, operating ATMs, and issuance of debit and credit cards. Banks completely control one 
category--operating ACH networks.  
The study shows that most payments activity has some nonbank presence. Nonbanks 
control virtually the entire market for check authorization and lead in online user authentication. 
Nonbanks are major suppliers of bank accounting systems and Internet banking software. 
Nonbanks have a large presence in provision of early-stage payments infrastructure (hardware, 
software, data processing of accounting systems) and dominate the hardware category. Nonbanks 
                                                 
1 Bradford, Davies, and Weiner (2003).  
2 Bradford, Davies, and Weiner (2003), Table 1, pp. 5-6.       
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originate roughly half of ACH payroll deposits. Nonbanks dominate ACH outsourcing, card-
issuer processing, business-to-business information exchange services, Web hosting, electronic 
bill presentment and payment services, person-to-person payments, retail wire services, money 
orders, and check cashing services.    
Bradford, Davies, and Weiner’s definition of a nonbank includes firms that may be 
governed or owned by a bank. As a result, for example, Visa is defined as nonbank even though 
it is governed by banks. Similarly, the payments processor Metavante is considered a nonbank 
despite being a subsidiary of the financial services firm Marshall and Isley.  
Because the focus of this study is the supervisory structure over nonbank participants in 
payments, and because bank affiliation can have consequences regarding supervisory authority, 
it adopts a different definition. In this study, a nonbank provider of payment services is not 
controlled or governed by one or more depository institutions. The organization may include a 
depository institution, but it is not a major element to the service provider’s business strategy, as 
evidenced by contributing a minor portion to the organization’s revenues. Examples include First 
Data Corporation and Fiserv, Inc.
3 By contrast a bank provider of payment services is controlled 
by a depository institution or a bank holding company, where the organization’s major focus is 
on providing banking services. Examples are TSYS (owned by Synovus Financial), Metavante, 
or Visa.  
Even with this different definition, it is not difficult to document the importance of 
nonbanks in payments. For example, recently published data on worldwide revenue of the top 50 
                                                 
3 First Data Corporation owns two limited purpose banks but does not use them for purposes of delivering financial 
services to consumers. Another interesting example of corporate structure is Concord EFS, Inc. prior to its merger 
with First Data Corporation. Concord owned a commercial bank to facilitate clearing and settlement operations. 
Because of this, Concord was required to register as a bank holding company and was subject to supervision by the 
Federal Reserve System. Nevertheless, Concord was a nonbank because its primary business was to provide 
payments processing services.       
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payment processors shows $40.6 billion in payments-related revenue generated in 2003.
4 Using 
the above definition to categorize the processors as banks or nonbanks reveals that only 13.4 
percent of the revenue went to bank-owned processors.  
Data revealing trends are scarce but we have relatively good data on regional ATM 
networks. Figure 1 shows the ownership information on the top 20 regional ATM networks for 
1985 to 2005. Networks are classified as being owned either by nonbanks, single depository 
institutions, or as joint ventures by two or more depository institutions. In 1990, nonbanks owned 
only two of the top 20 ATM networks. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, the share of network 
transactions processed by these two ATM networks was small.
5 But during the 1990s and 
through 2002 there was a clear trend towards more nonbank ownership of ATM networks. Much 
of this change in ownership was accompanied by consolidation of networks, leading to very 
large, nonbank-owned networks. In particular, Concord EFS, Inc. made several acquisitions of 
large, bank-owned networks and consolidated them into the STAR network. STAR is currently 
the largest regional electronic funds transfer (EFT) network in the United States.
6 Figure 2 
clearly shows a major change in the control of ATM transaction volume away from bank-owned 
networks in the period after 1995, a major portion of which is tied to expansion of the STAR 
network.  
________ ________ 
Figures 1 and 2 here. 
 
                                                 
4 “Payment System Industry Vendors” (2004). 
5 Figure 2 has a break at 2002/2003 because the way data on transaction volume was measured changed in 2003. 
Prior to that, many ATM transactions were counted by more than one ATM network. As a result, measures of 
aggregate market share could be above 100 percent. Much of the double counting was eliminated after 2003. The 
distribution of ownership was affected (Figure 1) but the distribution of transactions across ownership categories for 
2002 and 2003 (Figure 2) are broadly consistent. Most important, trends reflect the underlying changes in bank and 
nonbank ownership of the ATM networks.  
6 An EFT network transmits information on both ATM transactions as well as electronic payments associated with 
point of sale transactions.       
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Changes in the number of ATM networks owned by nonbanks since 2002 has been a 
result of mergers and acquisitions. Four events caused changes in the nonbank group since 2002. 
First, in EDS sold three separate networks to Fiserv, who in turn consolidated them into one 
network in 2004. Because both EDS and Fiserv are nonbanks, and because the merger had little 
effect on the aggregate transactions level of the three merged networks, the primary effect was 
on the distribution of ownership (Figure 1) rather than on the distribution of transactions (Figure 
2). Second, in 2003, First Data Corporation acquired Concord EFS, Inc., which gave First Data 
control of the STAR network. First Data, which owned a majority interest in the NYCE EFT 
network, subsequently sold NYCE to Metavante.
7 In these transactions, STAR remained under 
the control of a nonbank but control of NYCE changed from nonbank to bank. Because NYCE is 
a large network, the transaction had an impact both on the ownership (Figure 1) and the 
transaction distribution (Figure 2) for ATM networks in 2004. Third, the status of the 
MoneyMaker network changed from nonbank to single bank ownership when U.S. Bank bought 
it from Genpass in 2004. Fourth, also in 2004, the Pulse EFT network was acquired by Discover 
Financial Services, changing its status from a bank joint-venture to nonbank ownership. Because 
Pulse is the fourth-ranked EFT network (by average monthly transactions), the acquisition had a 
noticeable effect on the distribution of transactions (Figure 2) in 2005.  
While there has been some fluctuation in the distribution of ATM transactions since 
2002, the overall trend is clear. Nonbank owned networks process over one-half of ATM 
transactions today, while ten years ago their control was minimal. The dramatic change is one 
reason that bankers and policymakers have begun to closely monitor changes in the structure of 
the payments processing industry.  
                                                 
7 The sale was part of a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice, which had challenged the First 
Data/Concord merger on anti-trust grounds.       
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Another reason nonbank payment providers have drawn attention is the visible 
innovation they have brought to market, as illustrated by developments in electronic bill 
presentment and payment (EBPP), retailer issued debit cards, and online payments.  
While most EBPP is currently done directly on biller Web sites, growth of EBPP at 
consolidator sites is estimated to be twice that of biller sites.
8 CheckFree Corporation is the 
dominant provider of this service.
9 More recently, AOL has partnered with Yodlee to offer EBPP 
to AOL’s 23 million subscribers.
10 Another recent innovation is the retailer issued debit card. 
One example is a product of Debitman Card, Inc., which provides the origination and network 
processing services that facilitates retailer issuance of debit cards. Transactions processed 
through Debitman are less costly to retailer issuers, in part because the transaction goes through 
the ACH network rather than the EFT network.  
Arguably the most visible nonbank that has made major payment innovations in recent 
years is PayPal, the payments subsidiary of eBay. PayPal dominates the business of person to 
person online payments and has pioneered the provision of payment services to small online 
retailers. Though it was founded in 1998, it has grown rapidly and now has 96.2 million account 
holders worldwide. During the fourth quarter 2005, the value of PayPal’s total transaction 
volume was $8.1 billion, up 75 percent from the fourth quarter of 2004.
11 PayPal continues to 
develop its services and has recently announced initiatives to offer credit to accountholders and 
                                                 
8 A consolidator site can present billing information for many billers on a single Web page and typically offers an 
option to pay the bill; see Wolfe (2004), p. 17.  
9 CheckFree estimates it has a 75 to 80 percent share of this market; see “Paper Costs Cut through e-Payment 
Option,” (2004), p. 14.  
10 Ramsaran, (2004), p. 56.  
11 From eBay’s fourth quarter 2005 earnings report press release dated January 18, 2006, accessed at 
http://investor.ebay.com /financial.cfm.       
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to extend its payment services to retailers beyond the online auction market.
12  
First Data Corporation, CheckFree, Yodlee, Debitman, and PayPal are all nonbank 
organizations. They serve as examples of nonbanks involved in both front-end and back-end 
activities at various points along the flow of payments.  
 
The trend towards electronic payments 
Recent research by the Federal Reserve System has shed much light on the retail 
payments landscape.
 13 It has shown a rapid trend towards electronic payments that surprised 
many industry observers.   
The estimated number and value of transactions using checks, cards (debit and credit) and 
ACH for the years 1995, 2000 and 2003 are shown in Table 1.
14 Up to the year 2000, whether 
measured by transaction volume or value, noncash retail payments were conducted primarily 
with checks, followed by debit and credit cards and ACH. Despite confirmation of the 
predominance of checks, one surprising result of the research was that the estimated number of 
checks written in 2000 was 41.9 billion, much less than the commonly cited estimate of 60 
billion checks.  
___________ 
Table 1  here. 
 
More important, the research revealed a significant change in the mix of noncash retail 
payment instruments towards electronic payments (debit cards, credit cards, and ACH). The 
number of noncash retail payments using checks declined at an annual rate of 3.3 percent from 
                                                 
12 “Card Issuers Beware: PayPal to Offer Credit,” (2004); “PayPal Targets Music Download Micropayments,” 
(2003); and “PayPal, The Fifth Credit Card?” (2004).  
13 Gerdes and Walton (2002, 2005).  
14 Wholesale payments are much larger in average transaction value and in aggregate compared to retail payments. 
This has meant that policy towards controlling risk in wholesale payments systems is well developed. Because of 
this, and because most significant changes we observe are in retail payments, this paper focuses on retail payments.       
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1995 to 2000 and the decline was 4.5 percent per year from 2000 to 2003 (Table 2). For the same 
periods, electronic payments increased 14.6 and 12.4 percent annually. Some of the increase in 
electronic payments is due to economic and population growth and some is due to substitution of 
electronic payments for cash and checks.
15 The share of noncash retail payments using electronic 
instruments surged to 54.7 percent in 2003 from 22.9 percent in 1995.
16 More than half of 
noncash retail payments are now initiated electronically.  
___________ 
Table 2  here. 
 
The trend towards using electronic means for making payments is likely to accelerate. 
First, new methods of using electronic payments have been created. Conversion of paper checks 
into ACH payments in lockbox operations and at the point of sale promise to further reduce 
checks in favor of electronic payments. Additionally, new definitions of ACH transactions have 
made it easier to create ACH payments in telephone and online transactions. Second, the Check 
Clearing for the 21
st Century Act, which went into effect on October 28, 2004, provides further 
impetus to use electronic means for processing payments because it facilitates the use of check 
images in the check clearing process.  
The use of electronic payments and nonbank participation in the payments system may be 
related. Electronic payments use more advanced technology compared to checks. Banks may 
find developing expertise in electronic payments beyond their desired field of expertise and 
therefore may prefer to outsource the activity. In addition, the complexity of electronic payments 
offers opportunity for specialization which may draw nonbanks to the industry. If electronic 
payments and nonbank participation in the payments system are related, then a continued change 
                                                 
15 Federal Reserve System (2004), p. 4.  
16 Electronic payments are part of a broader movement towards IT intensive financial products and delivery systems. 
Use of the Internet for banking and brokerage services are examples.       
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in the mix of payments towards electronic forms suggests continued opportunities for nonbanks 
to enter the payments industry.  
 
III. Implications for risk in the retail payments system 
Both participation of nonbanks in payments and electronic means of making payments 
introduce new risks that are inherently different from risks associated with traditional payments 
systems. It may also magnify existing risks in the payments system. This section of the paper 
discusses these risks, beginning with risks of nonbank participation in the payments system and 
then turning to operational risks in electronic payment systems. It goes on to present examples of 
recent incidences of disruptions to the payments system. Lastly, this section explores how these 
risks in electronic payment networks may interact with risks of nonbank participation in 
payments.
17 
Before doing so, it is useful to make a distinction about the magnitude of risks in 
payments systems. Systemic risk occurs when one participant in a settlement process fails to 
meet its obligations, causing other participants to fail to meet their obligations. The chain 
reaction implied by systemic risk attracts a great amount of concern because it threatens the 
stability of financial markets. As a result, much effort is directed at designing settlement systems 
and associated internal controls in order to mitigate systemic risk.  
The payments system can face widespread disruption without systemic implications. 
Though not a threat to financial stability, such disruptions can be very costly due to the direct 
consequences of correcting the problem and to the opportunity costs of lost economic activity. 
                                                 
17 Any payment system must prepare for malicious activity (fraud and attacks) and non-malicious disruptions (errors 
and disasters) from internal or external sources. These risks are mitigated using appropriate security safeguards and 
bolstering resilience of the system. Rather than discuss these general principles, this section focuses on risks unique 
to paper and electronic payment systems. See Bradford, Weiner, and Davies (2003), pp. 9-11, for a more complete 
discussion of payments system risk.       
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The Bank of England has called this type of risk system-wide risk and has identified it as a major 
concern in its oversight of the British payments system.
18 While system-wide risk would not be 
associated with financial market instability, changes in the payments system point to trends that 
make large-scale disruptions more likely than in the past.  
 
Nonbank participation and risk in the payments system 
Participation in payments by nonbank firms can create a number of risks. While 
participation may pose limited settlement risk, there are serious concerns over operational, 
outsourcing, and legal risks.   
Nonbank payment processors can cause credit and liquidity risk to the extent that they 
have custody of funds that flow in the payments process, which in turn can disrupt the settlement 
of payments. For example, in some online bill payment systems, a third party provider has 
temporary custody of funds used to pay bills. If the service provider fails, then some bills may go 
unpaid. This, in turn, can cause problems for the bill payer and/or the biller.  
As documented in Bradford, Davies and Weiner, however, nonbank payment processors 
are generally not directly involved in settlement. Nevertheless, they warn not to ignore potential 
settlement risk issues:  
[R]elationships [of nonbank payment processors] with other payments 
participants are often complex and interrelated. A number of nonbank third-
party firms, for example, access the ACH system through what might be 
called “captive bank” relationships. This is a situation in which a bank 
provides a connection to a large corporate (nonbank) customer and allows 
that customer to initiate ACH transactions using one of the bank’s routing 
numbers. The bank, therefore, is warranting the transactions without having 
seen or processed them. While it is true that many of the risks associated 
with this type of arrangement are addressed in agreements between the two 
parties and final settlement remains “bank-to-bank,” there is significant 
nonbank involvement. Thus, in monitoring the payments environment, 
                                                 
18 Bank of England (2000), p. 173.      
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nothing should be taken for granted.
19 
 
Policymakers have expressed greater concern over operational risk in payments. 
According to the Bank for International Settlements, operational risk is a result of human error, 
breakdowns in some component of hardware, software, or communications systems associated 
with payments, or deficiencies in internal controls that could result in unexpected losses to 
payments participants or in disruptions to settlement.
20 This focus on operational risk in 
payments recognizes the increased dependence of the financial sector on information technology 
and communications systems.
21  
Concerns over operational risk are typically aimed at the clearing process, where 
payment information is routed and sorted in preparation for settlement, and at the process of final 
settlement. However, significant errors and disruptions may also occur at other points of the 
payments process, such as where payments are originated.  
An important element of operational risk associated with nonbank payment processors is 
outsourcing risk. The growth of nonbank payment processors means that many banks are moving 
payments processing from their own operational control to others. In some respects outsourcing 
may mitigate risks because the service provider often has expertise unavailable at the bank. But 
at a minimum outsourcing complicates management of some risks.
22  
Banks that outsource remain responsible for controlling risks of their payment operations. 
Federal supervisory agencies have issued guidance that identifies key elements for a bank to 
                                                 
19 Bradford, Davies, and Weiner (2003), p. 11. 
20 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003b), p. 36. 
21 Bank of England (2000), p. 174.  
22 See Robbins and VanWalleghem (2004) for a discussion of outsourcing core processing activities by community 
banks and managing associated risks.       
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effectively manage the risk of outsourcing.
23 These elements include assessing risks of 
outsourcing, carefully selecting service providers, and monitoring service provider performance. 
When deficiencies arise or when the needs of the bank changes, it should take necessary 
corrective steps.  
Outsourcing also exposes banks and nonbanks to legal risks. Legal risks associated with 
vendor contracting have received scrutiny because assignment of liability in contracting has 
implications regarding incentives to control risk. For example, when credit cards are used 
fraudulently for online purchases, merchants pay for the fraud, not the issuer of the card. 
Merchants argue that this reduces the incentive of card issuers to implement anti-fraud measures 
and to track down fraudulent activity for online purchases.
24 Perhaps more important, critical 
software and payments processing services are sometimes contracted so that the vendor does not 
face liability in case of failure.
25 In other words, the vendor does not face the full cost of errors 
for which it may be responsible, which implies insufficient incentive to produce high-quality, 
low risk services and software. To protect the payments system, analysts have proposed legal 
reform and regulation to rationalize liability and responsibility for risk in contracting 
relationships for payments processing.
26  
 
Operational risk in electronic payment networks 
Risks associated with electronic payment networks have been discussed from the 
beginning of their existence.
27 This section briefly reviews these risks, but to provide perspective 
on risks in electronic networks, it is useful to begin with an examination of risks associated with 
                                                 
23 Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (2004). 
24 Becket and Sapsford (2003).  
25 Menta (2004); Funnell (2005).  
26 Glaessner, Kellerman, and McNevin (2002), p. x; Glaessner, Kellerman, and McNevin (2004), pp. 23-4.  
27 An early example is Office of Technology Assessment, “Security in Electronic Funds Transfer” (1982). More 
recent discussions include McPhail (2003) and Lemieux (2003).       
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checks.   
Check-based payments have customarily been closed systems with the customer only 
involved at the first and last steps of transactions.
28 Whether processing is done internally at 
banks or outsourced, the closed system simplifies control of operational risk because access is 
limited. Risk in check processing has largely been confined to returns of individual checks due to 
insufficient funds (which can lead a depository institution to an unanticipated extension of credit) 
or to fraudulent checks.
29 There is some advantage in controlling these risks that comes from the 
time that elapses between deposit of checks and when funds are made available because the bank 
can withhold funds if a check is returned in a timely fashion. The potential for operational errors 
in check processing that would aggregate into large scale disruption is limited because checks 
require physical handling of individual items. Check clearing systems do aggregate to large 
dollar value at the point of settlement, which is also the point of greatest potential for large scale 
disruptions. Control of this risk is simplified by allowing only well-defined, approved parties 
access to Federal Reserve settlement accounts. Overall, years of experience have led to risks in 
check-based payment systems that are either well controlled or that pose limited widespread 
consequences.
30  
Electronic payment processing presents some challenges for risk control that are different 
from that of paper-based systems. Electronic systems are often on open access systems, such as 
online banking, which facilitates unauthorized access. ACH systems process in batches that 
contain large numbers of transactions that could cause wide disruptions if processing errors 
occur. Electronic networks are vulnerable to viruses, worms, denial of service attacks, Trojan 
                                                 
28 Lemieux (2003); Office of Technology Assessment (1982), p. 47.  
29 United States General Accounting Office (1997), p. 104.  
30 For example, since 1997 bank losses have been fairly steady despite a five-fold increase in attempts to commit 
check fraud; see Bills (2004).       
  15 
horses, and other problems. Electronic processing is very rapid, making it a challenge to halt 
processing errors before a large number of transactions are affected. Online debit transactions are 
processed in real time so that it may be impossible to reverse a fraudulent transaction.  
Electronic payments often depend on advanced technology. Rapid development of this 
technology complicates risk control because new sets of hard to determine threats arise with each 
generation of technology.
31 Past history of vulnerabilities offer less information so that effective 
risk control methods require new tools of management that are more forward looking.
32 High 
technology is also complex, causing banks to have a greater need for technical expertise. While 
banks that do not have this expertise internally can turn to third party providers, they 
nevertheless must have sufficient internal expertise to effectively manage their relationship with 
their vendors.
33 Similarly, bank regulatory agencies must also have examiners with technical 
expertise sufficient to understand the quality of the risk control environment in the information 
technology systems of supervised depository institutions and technology service providers.  
Additional challenges come from the network architecture in electronic payments.
34 
These networks are chains of separate elements that make up the flow of work in payment 
processing. Interconnections between elements imply that disruptions in one element may be 
easily transmitted to other elements. Electronic networks are also typically subject to strong 
economies of scale which can lead to an industrial structure that is highly concentrated. As a 
result, processors can be very large and disruptions can potentially have broad consequences. 
Similarly, many payment participants may be clients of a single software provider. Use of that 
software provider’s product by a large number of payment participants can create the potential 
                                                 
31 Kimball (2000), p. 8. 
32 McPhail (2003) p. 2 and 10.  
33 When asked about challenges they face in hiring new employees, community banks rank skills of potential 
employees as a significant challenge; see Myers (2001), p. 18.  
34 Bank of England (2000), p. 174; McPhail (2003), pp. 9-10.       
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for a single point of failure with widespread consequences.  
 
Recent disruptions and attacks on the retail payments system  
Attacks on and disruptions to the retail payments system are well documented. This 
section reviews some recent attacks and disruptions, some of which are security related, though 
many are not. Examples in this section are chosen to illustrate operational risk in payments in 
general.
35 Sources of information on payments disruptions typically do not provide sufficient 
detail to precisely determine where the incident occurred and so no attempt is made to segregate 
incidents by whether they arose in bank or nonbank controlled entities.  
A recent challenge to Internet security is called phishing, which involves widely 
distributed, falsely represented emails that try to get unsuspecting recipients to visit spoofed Web 
sites and disclose sensitive information such as user names and passwords. The Anti-Phishing 
Working Group tallied 16,882 unique phishing reports in November 2005, up 88 percent from 
the previous November, with 90 percent of the attacks aimed at financial services.
36 A variant of 
this scam combines phishing with an approach taken by virus writers by depositing a Trojan 
horse program on a computer.
38 If the user visits a banking site, the program logs the user’s key 
strokes and other information, and then transmits the information to the attacker. The user can 
unknowingly disclose a user name, password, and the bank he or she utilizes despite visiting a 
legitimate Web site.  
Attacks on Internet users commonly involve payments and may be on an upward trend. A 
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2003 study by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) reviewed Suspicious 
Activity Reports (SARs) tied to Internet or online banking.
39 The study reported 776 incidents 
filed by 291 separate financial institutions between April 1996 and April 2003, with the bulk of 
incidents (approximately 575) occurring in 2001 and 2002. The largest dollar amount reported 
was $82.3 million and 22 reports exceeded $1 million. The report cited Internet banks as having 
significant SAR activity and that 126 SARs were based on information provided to the banks by 
Internet service providers (ISPs). The most common violation was check fraud, with 90 percent 
of these involving small deposits upon opening an account through a bank Web site and 
subsequently depositing worthless or counterfeit checks. Other common violations involved 
money laundering, identity theft, hacking, and wire transfer fraud.  
A recent World Bank study tracked publicly known e-security incidents.
40 The study lists 
42 incidents, beginning with the 1995 attack on Citigroup that involved an unauthorized transfer 
of $10 million by Vladimir Levin, and ending with an attack in October 2003 on a U.S. 
brokerage firm where a hacker used a key logger to obtain information on customer accounts and 
went on to use the accounts to unload falling stocks owned by the hacker. Of the 42 incidents, 24 
involve payment-related activity, including unauthorized transfers or charges to credit cards, 
hacking aimed at stealing account, debit card or credit card information, Web site spoofing, 
phishing, unauthorized access to bank computer systems, and viruses or worms disabling ATMs 
or depository institution Web sites. The list includes the January 2003 incident where the release 
and rapid spread of the Slammer computer worm disrupted Bank of America’s ATMs and First 
Data Corporation’s processing system. It also includes the hack of Data Processors International 
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computer system that exposed the credit card information of eight million account holders.
41 One 
incident missing from the study’s list involved a gang of Eastern Europeans that allegedly rigged 
ATMs to capture personal bank account information. The ATMs were deployed in 2001 and 
2002, and used by at least 21,000 people, whose information was used to fake ATM cards and 
steal $3.5 million.
42  
Many security incidents are tied to the use of computers for both execution of 
transactions and storage of payments information. In 2003 customer account information was 
exposed when laptop computers were stolen from two different banks.
43 In 2004, 
Pharmacycards.com represented itself as an Internet business selling discount drug cards, but 
was apparently a scam that used checking account information from 90,000 customers to 
generate unauthorized debits against the accounts.
44 Hackers have created add-ons to Internet 
Web browsers that, when a user visits the Web sites of specified large, well known banks, record 
key strokes to capture and transmit logon information to the hacker.
45  
There is rising concern that electronic payments are making it easier for thieves to target 
checking accounts.
46 The ACH system is experiencing high rates of unauthorized transactions 
associated with newly created e-check forms of ACH transactions.
47 In 2005, losses to the 
banking industry due to ACH fraud rose 62.5 percent over the previous year.
48 Recently, thieves 
have apparently outsmarted the system that protects PIN codes on debit cards, resulting in 
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thousands of dollars disappearing from the accounts of unsuspecting bank customers.
49  
Recent awareness of large-scale security breaches has soared. Between February 15, 
2005 and April 14, 2006, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reports that nearly 55 million people 
have had their personal information compromised.
51 The year 2005 has been called the worst for 
computer security breaches.
52 Many breaches involve unauthorized access to large numbers of 
records that contain personal information and/or information about payment cards.  Analysis 
suggests that the majority of recent breaches have occurred in educational institutions but that 
most breaches that could result in identity theft occurred in the financial sector.
53  
The actual cost of these security breaches is uncertain. Some have argued that fraud 
relating to these breaches is rare and that most of the cost related to identity theft is borne by 
businesses.
54 On the other hand, a recent increase in the rate of disputed credit card transactions 
that were charged back to merchants has been tied to security breaches.
55 Moreover, identity 
theft was the most common topic for consumer complaints to the Federal Trade Commission in 
2005.
56   
Not all disruptions involve compromised security. The terrorist attack of September 11, 
2001 prevented some banks from sending payments through the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire 
payments system, causing unexpected shortfalls in bank liquidity positions and requiring 
liquidity injections by the Federal Reserve in order to return to normal patterns of payments 
                                                 
49 Sullivan (2006).  
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52 Swartz (2005).  
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coordination.
60 In addition, check clearing was seriously hampered due to the grounding of 
airline flights.
61 Though less disruptive, in March 2004 computer and human error at First Data 
Corporation resulted in overcharges of 800,000 credit and debit card transactions to accounts of 
WalMart customers.
62 The error took two days to correct, with some corrections keyed in by 
hand. In April 2004, a software glitch caused a two day crash of the U.S. Central Credit Union’s 
network for handling ACH transactions and delayed transactions for as much as four days.
63 
When made aware that funds were not going to arrive on time, one credit union extended $1.8 
million in credit to cover expected deposits for its members. Finally, relatively high rates of 
disputed transactions for some new forms of ACH transactions are increasingly accepted as 
reflecting the underlying risk of those transactions and are managed as a form of ongoing 
operational risk.
64   
 
Interactions of risks due to nonbank payment providers and electronic payments 
Risks tied to participation of nonbanks in the payments process interact with risks 
associated with electronic networks. Some interaction may magnify risks and compound issues 
of risk control.  
Nonbanks can add another link in the chain of information flows in payments clearing 
and settlement, which by itself adds complexity to the control of risk in payments. When the 
nonbank is part of an electronic payments network, it can also add new locations where people 
can access the payments system and increase the potential number of threats to the system. In 
addition, a more open access to the payments process has introduced new players into security 
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concerns. For example, a recent survey identified illegal access to checking accounts as the 
fastest growing type of financial fraud in the U.S.
65 There is also indication that motivation of 
hackers has moved from seeking thrills to economic gain.
66   
The payments system is an amalgam of bank and nonbank entities, financial and 
technical firms, and public and private enterprises. Specific characteristics of these payment 
participants have different implications regarding supervisory oversight. As a result, some 
payment providers are heavily supervised, others escape supervision altogether, and some firms 
are between these two extremes. This differential degree of oversight may be appropriate to the 
level of risk to payments posed by each individual participant. As payments rely more and more 
on electronic networks these oversight differences are harder to justify because the interactions 
implicit in electronic networks expose all payments participants to risks of other participants.  
Nonbank payment providers in electronic networks pose challenges even if they are 
supervised because they have risk profiles that are different from those that traditionally concern 
supervisors of depository institutions. These differences are due to factors such as financial 
leverage, the opacity of assets, distortions to risk-taking behavior due to the federal safety net for 
depository institutions, the scale of operations, and the sophistication of technology applied in 
business processes. While it is difficult to judge whether nonbank firms are (overall) more or less 
risky than banks, it is clear that nonbank risk profiles are considerably different than those of 
banks. The supervisory process that governs oversight of nonbanks has evolved over time, but it 
is uncertain whether the evolution of the supervisory process is sufficient to manage the risks 
that have accompanied the trend towards more nonbank companies providing electronic payment 
services to depository institutions.  
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Finally, the interaction among participants in electronic payment networks generates 
conflicts of interest that make control of risk difficult. For example, dependence on electronic 
communications introduces a new set of vendors into payments processing that supply security 
as well as many interlinking services (Web site hosting, ISPs, and telecommunications 
companies). Security incidents at these providers reflect poorly on their services and they have 
incentive to limit the spread of news about any incident. But effective risk control of the 
payments system requires good information about security breaches, both to warn other 
participants about specific problems and to design effective mechanisms to control risk. This 
conflict of interest motivates calls for regulatory mandates regarding reporting security breaches 
and operational disruptions.
67  
In summary, nonbank service providers introduce new operational, outsourcing, and legal 
risks into the payments system. Electronic payment networks generate risks associated with open 
access, rapid and large scale processing, sophisticated technology, and interdependencies in 
network architecture. Examples of threats and disruptions to payments are commonplace, and 
while disruptions thus far have not risen to the level of a systemic problem, numerous disruptions 
qualify as system-wide disturbances. The confluence of nonbank participation in payments and 
electronic payment networks compounds risks due to new participants in provision of payments, 
differential degrees of supervision, different risk profiles of payments providers, and conflicts of 
interest.  
 
IV. The current supervisory approach to nonbank payment providers 
In recognition of the risks that outsourcing poses to depository institutions. policymakers 
have authorized supervision of certain nonbank organizations that provide services to the 
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banking industry. Supervision of nonbank payment providers is conducted as part of this 
program. This section of the paper describes the supervision program by reviewing its authority 
and organization, the activities covered under the program, the process used to select entities for 
supervision, and the risk-based approach to supervision and examination. The section gives 
special attention to the place that nonbank payment providers have in the program.  
 
Authority and organization 
Authority for supervision of firms that provide outsourced services to depository 
institutions comes from the 1962 Bank Service Company Act. At that time, computer automation 
of crucial bank accounting systems and payments processing was growing important. The high 
fixed cost of computers led some banks to share facilities by creating service companies that 
were co-owned by several banks, while other banks outsourced the service to nonbank 
companies. The primary purpose of the Act was to provide legislative authority (with specified 
limits) allowing banks to invest in service companies. Section 5 of the Act contained provisions 
regarding supervision. It confirmed the supervisory authority of federal agencies over bank-
owned computer service companies. More important, it made explicit that this authority extended 
to nonbank owned servicers.
68  
The Act enumerated the types of services covered, such as processing associated with 
maintaining checking and savings accounts, computation and posting of interest, or bookkeeping, 
accounting and statistical functions. Testimony in hearings for the Act suggests some concern 
over the extent of supervision of nonbank service providers. Critics noted that providers may be 
reluctant to supply services specialized to the banking industry if they faced potential 
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regulation.
69 Perhaps to counter this criticism, the legislative record contains several statements 
that nonbank supervision and regulation would be limited to core banking functions and that 
examinations would look only at bank-related records and services.
70  
Because authority for examining a nonbank service provider flows from the service 
provider’s relationship with a depository institution, responsibility falls to the federal agency that 
supervises the depository institution. If a service provider’s client has a national bank charter, for 
example, then the provider could be examined by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), the federal supervisor of national banks.  
The relationship between federal supervisory agencies and bank service providers has 
created some challenges. For example, different agencies may apply different standards for 
evaluating bank service companies. Another issue is that many service providers may have 
multiple depository institution clients, often under the authority of more than one federal 
supervisor. Thus, the company could be subject to multiple examinations. To overcome these 
challenges, federal agencies cooperate in supervising bank service companies. Interagency 
cooperation regarding examination of bank service providers goes back at least to the mid-1970s. 
For example, in 1978 these efforts produced an interagency rating system for IT examinations.
71  
A new level of interagency cooperation came with the 1979 establishment of the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). Members of the FFIEC represent all of the 
federal agencies responsible for regulating and supervising of U.S. depository institutions, 
including the OCC, the Federal Reserve System (FRS), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the National Credit Union 
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Administration (NCUA). It promotes uniformity across agencies in the federal examination of 
depository institutions by prescribing uniform examination principles, developing common 
reporting systems, and conducting schools for examiners.  
Under the auspices of the Information Technology (IT) Subcommittee of the FFIEC, the 
agencies cooperate in supervising technology service providers (TSPs). The IT Subcommittee 
oversees development of examination guidelines and establishment of uniform rating systems for 
providers of information system services to banks. The IT Subcommittee also establishes policy 
regarding the administration of TSP examinations, such as agency responsibility, which TSPs get 
examined, the frequency of examination, and the scope of supervision.  
The FFIEC does not employ examiners itself but instead coordinates the activities of 
examiners from its member agencies. In 1981 it sponsored the first nationally coordinated 
examination of a large data processing company that operated in more than one region.
72 Prior to 
this, the common practice regarding large TSPs was for local offices of regulatory agencies to 
examine individual processing centers that served the depository institutions in the particular 
region or district of the agency. As a result, different local processing centers for the same TSP 
could be examined by different agencies.  
The FFIEC approach introduced a number of innovations. Deployment of examination 
resources for specified large TSPs was managed on a national basis. Examinations were first 
scheduled for the TSP’s regional data centers, followed by examination of the TSP’s 
headquarters. Examiners then wrote a consolidated exam report that assessed the overall risk of 
the TSP. The success of this approach led to its expansion in the 1980s. By pooling resources, 
conducting a single exam, and sharing results, the program reduces regulatory burden on the TSP 
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and improves supervisory efficiency.  
 
Supervised activities and entities 
Activities covered by TSP examination have changed over time. Early exams covered 
hardware and software associated with general ledger accounting, transaction recording, and 
check processing such as transport, capture, and reconciliation. TSP exams subsequently 
expanded to match changes in technology employed by banks. Examinations went beyond 
electronic data processing to include information systems as banks began to employ these 
systems in the early 1970s. TSP examinations began to cover electronic payments as banks 
adopted automated teller machines, electronic funds transfer, telephone banking, and Internet 
banking.  
The supervisory community becomes aware of what TSPs are providing covered 
activities to depository institutions through several channels. The process of examination of 
depository institutions typically begins with a request for a variety of information from the 
institution, such as identities of significant TSPs. Examiners may also identify TSPs in on-site 
examinations or through ongoing monitoring activity. Finally, a 1978 amendment to the Bank 
Service Company Act added a requirement that depository institutions inform their primary 
regulator within 30 days of making an outsourcing agreement.
73  
FFIEC policy states that any supervised TSP whose clients include depository institutions 
from more than one charter class must be conducted jointly or rotated among relevant 
supervisory agencies.
74 Supervised TSPs are administered either nationally or regionally. Those 
that are nationally administered are in the Multi-Regional Data Processing Servicer (MDPS). An 
organization is considered for the MDPS program when it provides core information system 
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applications for a large number of depository institutions or if it works from a number of data 
centers located in different geographic regions.
75 TSPs included in the MDPS program are 
considered to pose systemic risk.
76  
TSPs that service depository institutions from more than one charter class, but are not 
included in the MDPS program, are administered regionally.
77 Regional headquarters of agencies 
that supervise the clients of the TSP cooperate to set examination schedules and other 
supervisory activity. TSPs in this category may be examined jointly by several agencies, or by a 
single agency designated on a rotating basis. Supervised TSPs that serve a single class of 
depository institutions may be supervised by the agency responsible for the charter class of the 
TSP’s clients.  
Approximately 125 TSPs are supervised and Table 3 presents characteristics of those for 
which information is available. Both nonbank and bank TSPs are in the supervision program, but 
there are more nonbank TSPs (83) than bank-affiliated TSPs (42).  
___________ 
Table 3 here. 
 
Estimates of the number of clients served by supervised TSPs range from one to 21,000, 
with a median of 16.5 clients (Table 3).
78 Estimates of the number of business lines offered range 
from 1 to 16 with a median of 4 business lines. Nonbank TSPs tend to have more clients (median 
number of clients is 25) than bank affiliated TSPs (median number of clients is 9).  The median 
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number of lines of business for nonbank and bank affiliated TSPs is the same at 4 clients. On 
these measures, there is no strong reason to believe that nonbank TSPs tend to be considerably 
more complex than bank-affiliated TSPs.  
 
Risk-based approach to supervision and examination  
The FFIEC uses a risk-based approach for TSP supervision and examination. The goal of 
the approach is to aim examination resources at areas of “highest potential risk to... [a TSP’s] 
serviced financial institutions.”
79 An evaluation of TSP risk determines the time frame for 
examination and monitoring activity, and helps identify TSPs that would come under the MDPS 
program.
80  
In this approach examiners evaluate TSPs using a two-dimensional risk matrix. The first 
dimension is risk in business lines. Table 4 lists the business lines considered along with the 
level of risk the FFIEC assigns to the activity. There are 21 lines of business considered, each 
separated into a high, average, and low risk category. Payments-related activities, shown in bold 
type, account for 10 of the 21 activities.
81 High risk payment activities include clearing and 
settlement, corporate electronic banking and wholesale payments. Bill payment, check 
processing, and issuing credit cards fall into the low risk category. Examples of average risk 
payment activities include ACH processing and retail electronic banking.   
__________ 
Table 4 here. 
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The other dimension is “service provider” risk, which is evaluated using several criteria.
82 
One is the quantity of services processed by the TSP, measured by factors such as the number 
and aggregate value of transactions processed and/or the number and aggregate assets of client 
institutions. For example, a TSP with 250 or more client depository institutions might be 
considered high risk. Other criteria include effectiveness of internal oversight at the TSP, 
inherent risk of the TSP’s technology, and reports of problems at the TSP. The risk analysis then 
combines the two risk ratings and assigns each TSP to one of four exam priority ratings (A, B, C 
or NA, with “A” indicating the most risk).
83  
This risk-based structure provides guidelines for examination and monitoring activity.
84 
All TSPs are informally reviewed to confirm information about the TSP and its rating at least 
every 18 months. A-rated TSPs are to be examined at least every two years, while B-rated TSPs 
are on a maximum three year exam cycle.  
An MDPS examination follows guidelines published by the FFIEC. Examiners evaluate 
risks that are common to TSPs, such as technology management, data integrity and 
confidentiality, availability of information technology services, and financial stability.
85 The 
guidelines emphasize the structure in place at the TSP to control risk in information technology 
systems. The guidelines recognize that financial instability at the TSP could also reduce the 
quality and reliability of service for clients and potentially limit the TSP’s ability to control risks 
to which its clients are exposed.
86 This increased concern over financial stability may have 
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motivated recent inclusion of a cash flow analysis to the report on examination.
87  
For each exam, a single agency is designated as the lead supervisor responsible for 
planning the examination. The lead agency can draw on resources of all agencies for 
examination personnel.  
The examination assigns ratings to the TSP based on the Uniform Ratings System for 
Information Technology (URSIT).
88 URSIT contains four individual components:  
1.  Audit: ability of the TSP to provide independent assessment of risk exposure and to 
institute internal controls associated with acquisition, implementation, and use of 
information technology.  
2.  Management: quality of addressing IT risks in management practices such as strategic 
planning, quality assurance, infrastructure development, administering third-party 
service providers, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  
3.  Development and Acquisition: quality of identifying, acquiring, installing, and 
maintaining information technology applications.  
4.  Support and Delivery: ability to provide high quality IT operations and deliver 
reliable and secure information.  
Examiners assign a rating to each URSIT component and compile a composite rating on a scale 
from 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest).  
Examiners at the lead agency produce a Report on Examination (ROE) following a 
uniform FFIEC format.
89 One section of the exam discloses the composite rating and details all 
significant findings, conclusions, and management comments on unsafe and unsound practices, 
noncompliance with statutes and regulations, and other deficiencies. This section is distributed to 
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the TSP and other agencies. The section is also available to all bank clients of the TSP through 
their primary regulator. A confidential section of the exam includes component ratings and 
administrative details of the exam.  
It is important to emphasize that the purpose of TSP supervision is not the survival of the 
TSP or the viability of its business model.
90 Rather, the TSP supervision program is targeted as a 
service to the supervisors of depository institutions. It is useful because examiners of depository 
institutions have a resource that they can draw upon to understand the risks that an outsourcing 
relationship might pose for the depository institution. The focal point is the risk to serviced 
depository institutions. Ultimately TSP examination seeks to ensure that there is a control 
environment that adequately addresses these risks.  
 
Shared Application Software Review program 
A second nationally administered supervision program is the Shared Application 
Software Review (SASR) program, which reviews software for accounting, account 
management, and other applications that depository institutions may purchase and run on their 
own computer facilities.
91 Software programs chosen for SASR reviews are either used by a 
large number of depository institutions or are for high risk applications (such as wire transfers, 
capital market investment management, or general ledger accounting). The SASR program is 
much smaller than the TSP supervision program, with only a handful of participants.  
Because a software vendor is not in an outsourcing relation with its bank clients, the 
Bank Service Company Act does not apply and federal supervisory agencies do not have 
authority to examine the vendor. The SASR program is therefore strictly voluntary.  
As with the MDPS program, a SASR review is primarily a service to the supervisors of 
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depository institutions. The program provides reviews of widely used software and gives 
examiners information useful for evaluating turnkey software systems at depository institutions. 
It helps identify weaknesses in the software that may require compensating controls at the 
depository institution. The SASR report is confidential and is not shared with depository 
institutions that use the software. The software vendor may find benefit from information in the 




Payments processing in the TSP supervision program 
In the process of evaluating risk, examiners report the lines of business offered at TSPs. 
In order to gauge the extent to which payment activities are covered in the TSP supervision 
program, Table 5 summarizes this information.
93  
______ ____ 
Table 5 here. 
 
Core processing (computer processing of general ledger accounting and of information 
systems), offered by 68 of 125 supervised TSPs, is the single most important line of business. 
Compared to nonbank TSPs, core processing is more likely to be offered by bank-affiliated 
TSPs. Core processing is offered by 73.8 percent of bank-affiliated TSPs but by only 44.6 
percent of nonbank TSPs.  
While core processing is the most common activity, payments are also a common focus 
of supervised TSPs. Whether a TSP is counted as providing payment services is based on it 
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offering at least one of 11 payment-related lines of business.
94 Seventy percent (87 of 125) 
supervised TSPs offer at least one type of payment processing service.  
There is some difference in the types of services offered by nonbank and bank-affiliated 
TSPs, but the difference is not highly related to payment services, as both nonbank and bank-
affiliated TSPs are heavily oriented towards offering payment processing services. The 
difference is the emphasis the TSPs place on core processing and other lines of business.
95 Bank-
affiliated TSPs tend towards core processing while nonbank TSPs tend towards other lines of 
business. Though the category “other business lines” is a mixed group of activities, it does 
include some services that reflect new technical necessities of financial services, such as 
electronic banking, electronic recordkeeping, imaging, disaster recovery, and credit scoring. 
Nonbank TSPs may have some competitive advantage in offering these new services.  
The supervision program tilts strongly towards payment-related lines of business. Eighty-
one percent of nationally supervised TSPs offer at least one payment processing service. 
Moreover, only 5 of the 16 TSPs in the national supervision program are bank affiliated. The 
national supervision tends to focus on nonbank TSPs and on payments related lines of business. 
This correspondence could reflect the economics underlying payments processing. Payments 
processing may lend itself to a large scale of operation and a nonbank form of organization may 
facilitate large-scale operation.  
While the largest nonbank payments providers are well represented in the TSP 
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supervision program, it does not cover all TSPs that offer payments services. The Bank Service 
Company Act is sufficiently narrow that it may exclude many significant payment providers. In 
particular, nonbank TSPs must be in an outsourcing relationship with a bank to be eligible for 
supervision. But many payment providers are customers of banks. For example, PayPal or 
Ceridian Corp. originate many payments and pass that information to banks for further 
processing.
96 In this instance the originator is purchasing payment services from the bank. A 
similar relationship exists between banks and acquirers of POS transactions or originators of 
many ACH transactions. As such, risk control via direct supervision is currently not an option for 
these elements of the payments network.  
To summarize this section, supervision of nonbank payment providers is part of a broader 
program of supervising technology service providers. TSP supervision is coordinated by the 
FFIEC and executed by federal supervisory agencies in both a national and a regional program. 
The programs use a risk-based approach in selecting, monitoring and examining TSPs, and 
payment activities are important elements in the method of evaluating risk. Compared to bank-
affiliated TSPs, nonbank TSPs in the program tend to be larger and more complex. Both 
nonbank and bank-affiliated TSPs commonly offer payments-related lines of business, 
particularly TSPs in the nationally administered supervision program. Finally, while major 
nonbank payment providers are well represented in the TSP supervision program, some 
significant payment providers may not be in the program.  
 
V. Summary and Discussion 
A 1997 report on risks in payments, settlement, and clearing by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office identifies credit risk, fraud, and malicious activity as the main risks in retail 
                                                 
96 If they do provide outsourced services to banks, these organizations may be eligible for the TSP supervision 
program.       
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payments. Given the prevalence of checks in payments and the early stage of the Internet at the 
time of the report, the GAO conclusion was reasonable. But today, with the great reliance of 
payments on electronic networks and on nonbank payment providers, the risk profile of retail 
payments is significantly different. Unauthorized access, virus infections, malicious attacks, and 
operational breakdowns have become part of the payments landscape. Some of the disruptions to 
payments caused by these problems are severe enough to qualify as system-wide risks and seem 
to be coming with greater frequency.  
The emergence of nonbanks as elements in the payments system, at a minimum, alters the 
mix of risks in the payment system and potentially magnifies old or introduces new risks. 
Nonbanks complicate control of outsourcing risk and can introduce weaknesses to the payment 
system by adding locations for access or by introducing innovations with potential hazards. 
Rapid conversion of retail payments from checks to electronic form presents similar challenges, 
some of which can exacerbate those posed by nonbank payment providers.  
In the U.S. there is good control of risk in critical elements of the retail payments system, 
such as in wholesale clearing and settlement, reserve account administration, and supervision of 
banks and major nonbank payment providers. However, some retail payment providers are 
supervised while others are not. Moreover, oversight of the payments system lacks systematic 
analysis of interactions between elements of the payments network.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer conclusions regarding whether the current 
oversight structure is adequate. Instead, this final section will discuss some key questions that 
should be explored further. First, what is the public policy interest in the oversight of retail 
payments? Second, how should payments system oversight address the risks inherent in the 
network structure of electronic payments? Third, what techniques should be used to control risk      
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in the retail payments system? Fourth, what information do we need to more fully inform any 
changes in policy towards payments system risk?  
 
Network issues and public policy towards retail payments 
Recognition that an efficient, safe and accessible payments system is crucial to a well-
functioning economy underlies the public policy interest in payment system oversight. The large 
flows of payments through wholesale payment systems and their linkages to other financial 
markets, for example, imply significant consequences of disruptions. As such, public policy has 
placed much emphasis in controlling risk in wholesale payment systems.  
Public policy also recognizes the potential risk in retail payments. Ideally, the retail 
payment system inspires confidence and trust. Generally accepted policy to attain efficiency and 
safety of retail payments include removing impediments to innovation and market development, 
fostering competitive payment markets, supporting development of effective standards and 
infrastructure, and providing effective central bank services for their particular market.
97 
Regulatory and operational intervention may be warranted if market forces cannot achieve 
efficient and safe retail payments. In the past, regulatory intervention in the U.S. retail payment 
market has been relatively limited because market forces have generally been effective in 
producing innovation without undo risk.
98  
Recent development of the retail payments system has raised concerns that in the future 
market forces may not adequately control risk in retail payments because of greater reliance on 
                                                 
97 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003a), pp. 4-5.  
98 In a speech delivered in April 1998, Roger Ferguson of the Board of Governors stated that “I do not believe that 
the market for new retail electronic payment services reflects the existence of market failures.... The government 
should avoid regulatory actions that may inhibit the evolution of emerging payments products and services or 
prevent the effective operation of competitive market forces. It is not clear whether, or what type of, regulation will 
be needed for many new products and it is important to avoid jumping to the conclusion that such regulations are 
inevitable over the longer term.” See Ferguson (1998).        
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electronic payment networks and the associated increase in nonbank payment providers. The 
primary issue is that an individual participant in an electronic payment network has incentive to 
implement risk controls that reflects private costs and benefits. But the interrelated nature of 
participants in the payments network implies that some benefit of individual risk control accrues 
to other network participants. This implies that the social benefits of implementing risk controls 
will be greater than the private benefits. From society’s point of view, without some form of 
policy interference in the payments market, insufficient resources may be applied to controlling 
risk in payments.
99  
Although the potential for market failure in retail payments exists, whether it is 
meaningful would need to be more sufficiently documented before a strong case for major 
changes to policy towards retail payment oversight can be made. The types of disruptions to 
retails payments documented above (pp. 16-20) are instructive but are anecdotal and may be 
incomplete. The final section below recommends that systematic data on payment system 
disruptions be collected to better inform policy decisions.  
Perhaps the greatest risk that policy should address is the undermining of the trust and 
confidence that the public has in the retail payments system. Awareness of the vulnerability of 
retail payments to fraud and operational disruptions is growing. All of the major options for retail 
payments, other than cash, are moving towards electronic technology where networks effects and 
incentive issues are most acute. What if the public becomes widely distrustful of the reliability 
and security of their bank and credit card accounts? What would be the consequences if they 
reduce their use of these accounts and use more cash in their retail payments?  
 
                                                 
99 Bank of England (2000), p. 172.       
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Oversight of payments system risk 
While all share the same objective of a smooth functioning payment system, central 
banks vary in their oversight responsibilities. A recent study of seven industrialized nations 
found that the central banks of these countries all worked to ensure that wholesale payments 
systems operated effectively and with minimal systemic risk.
 100 Approaches varied, however, 
depending on structure and history of their banking systems and the involvement of the central 
bank in clearing, settlement, and provision of payment services.  
The laws of these countries typically limit central bank regulation to controlling systemic 
risk. Laws of the U.S. do not have this restriction.
101 For example, the Federal Reserve Bank has 
authority to regulate availability of funds in check clearing and to protect consumers in accessing 
and use of various electronic fund transfer systems.
102  
The Federal Reserve System (FRS) has a number of programs that directly or indirectly 
controls payments system risk. First, the FRS payments system risk policy focuses on reserve 
account management and settlement risk.
103 The policy outlines requirements upon holders of 
reserve accounts and procedures for managing daylight overdrafts in order to limit liquidity and 
credit risk. Second, the Federal Reserve participates in national and international policy 
processes that set standards for operating and controlling risk in payment systems. The FRS 
policy statement on payments system risk, for example, specifies standards for controlling risk in 
private sector clearing and settlement systems.
104 Third, the Federal Reserve operates a check 
clearing system and an automated clearinghouse. A major goal of the Federal Reserve is to 
                                                 
100 U.S. General Accounting Office (2002), pp. 2-3.  
101 U.S. General Accounting Office (2002), p. 13.  
102 The Expedited Funds Availability Act (1987) and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (1978) grant the authority. 
103 Federal Reserve Board (2004), pp. 1-13.  
104 Federal Reserve Board (2004), pp. 13-22. Another example is Federal Reserve participation in international 
efforts at setting bank capital standards.       
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operate these retail payments systems in an efficient and safe manner. Moreover, it participates 
with industry groups such as the National Automated Clearinghouse Association to set standards 
that mitigate risk. Fourth, the Federal Reserve supervises and regulates depository institutions 
and certain nonbank participants in the payments system. A significant component of this 
program is control of operational and other risks associated with payment activities.  
Federal Reserve policy statements make it clear that private institutions bear heavy 
responsibility for control of risk in payments. The Boards of Directors at depository institutions 
need to be actively involved in controlling risk in outsourcing arrangements.
105 Oversight of 
TSPs by client institutions is preferable to separate, on-site examination of TSPs.
106 Participants 
in private clearing and settlement systems have primary responsibility to address risks that arise 
in the systems.
107   
Although this emphasis on controlling risk by individual participants in the payments 
system is crucial, the potential for electronic payment networks to provide inadequate incentives 
for participants to implement risk controls suggests a role for regulation. In particular, some have 
advocated what might be called an umbrella model for oversight of the payments system. This 
model stresses the systemic nature of payments that provides a more robust perspective of risk 
than when each element of that payments network is analyzed separately.
108  
Who would take on this responsibility? A central bank may be in a position to 
successfully implement this umbrella oversight function because of its unique, neutral role in 
overseeing the payments system.
109 It might, in particular, take responsibility for understanding 
and controlling disruptions that spill over from one participant in the retail payments network to 
                                                 
105 Federal Reserve Board (2000b).  
106 Federal Reserve Board (2000a).  
107 Federal Reserve Board (2004), p. 14.  
108 McPhail (2003), p. 1.  
109 McPhail (2003), p. 11.      
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other participants. However, central bank linkage to the payments system is primarily with other 
financial institutions, and the risk in retail payments often extends beyond financial institutions. 
For example, enforcement of federal requirements for safeguarding personal financial 
information involves supervisory agencies over depository institutions as well as the Federal 
Trade Commission, who enforces the requirements for many non-bank financial institutions.
110 
Similarly, information on consumer deposit or credit card accounts often resides at retail 
companies. Who would be responsible for enforcing regulations to protect that information? At a 
minimum, effective oversight responsibilities for retail payments in the United States may need 
to involve some interaction with federal and state agencies that supervise depository institutions 
and would likely involve interactions with other federal or state agencies.   
If the Federal Reserve were to become more active in oversight of retail payments, it 
would need to reconsider some policy stances. It has traditionally focused on payments system 
risk arising in clearing and settlement systems in wholesale payment systems. Concern over risk 
in electronic payment networks implies some attention to risk at the retail level of payments. 
This could be expressed along the same lines taken by the Bank of England by acknowledging 
that system-wide risk is important when costs of disruption are significant even if the magnitude 
is not at the level of systemic risk.
111 Emphasis in supervision may also need to be changed. 
Supervision of TSPs currently stresses the direct threats to the viability of depository institutions 
posed by outsourcing. In an umbrella model of payments system oversight, equal emphasis may 
need to be placed on system-wide risk in order to encourage examiner assessment of controls 
that manage risk that could be passed on to others in the payments network. This may also imply 
                                                 
110 These non-bank financial institutions include organizations that make consumer loans, transfer or safeguard 
money, prepare individual tax returns, provide financial advice or credit counseling, provide residential real estate 
settlement services or collect consumer debts. See the FTC Web site (http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/) for more 
information.  
111 Bank of England (2000), p. 173.       
  41 
changes to oversight in terms of eligibility for oversight and/or resources applied to supervision 
of nonbank participants in the payments network.  
 
Scope and process of payments system oversight 
A variety of techniques can be used to control payments system risk. Some of these 
techniques rely primarily on direct interaction between market participants with little 
government involvement while others rely on a fair amount of government oversight. The 
significant challenge is determining the optimal mix of techniques that attains an appropriate 
level of safety at a reasonable cost.  
The following are four categories of techniques that can be used to control risk in retail 
payments, in a rough ordering by the degree of government involvement.  
 
1. Private contracting and disclosure.  
Private contracting and disclosure, if used appropriately, provide incentives for payment 
system participants to implement controls for payments system risk. As mentioned above (p. 13), 
there are concerns that disclaimers in outsourcing contracts may distort incentives of vendors to 
control risk. Bank supervisors advise banks to carefully review contracts with vendors to ensure 
rights and responsibilities regarding vendor performance and information security.
115 These 
concerns also extend to general technology services, such as computer hardware and operating 
systems, leading some analysts to call for reforms to the entire legal framework that defines 
liability among payment system participants.
116  
Careful use of contractual relationship can provide incentives for all participants in the 
                                                 
115 Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (2004), p. 13.  
116 Glaessner, Kellerman, and McNevin (2002), p. xi.       
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payments network to mitigate risk. The credit card associations, for example, specify upper 
limits on rates of charge-backs to card-present transactions that can lead to penalties on 
originators if violated. In this instance both parties are subject to potential costs of fraudulent use 
of credit cards, so that each has incentives to develop effective controls for fraud. Similarly, 
NACHA has changed its operating rules in the face of excessive rates of unauthorized ACH 
transactions so that originators of the transactions are required to mitigate these risks.
117  
Disclosure can also help ensure that network participants can address risk in technical 
interrelationships. For example, a SAS 70 audit is an evaluation of the control structure of an 
organization over information security risks and the written report can provide information to a 
TSP’s clients about potential exposure.
118 Proposals to more widely release exam reports for 
major vendors in the TSP supervision program have a similar purpose.
119 Done properly, this can 
convey information about a firm’s risk control environment without compromising security and 
allow clients to seek out vendors with high quality internal controls.  
Recent legislation, such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, has placed added responsibility 
on financial institutions to ensure that their TSPs are adequately protecting sensitive information. 
In turn, the TSP community is bearing significant costs of providing information on its security 
to its clients. TSPs would like to see more comprehensive standards set so that vehicles such as 
SAS 70 audits will satisfy the needs of its clients and reduce the burden of customized disclosure 
to individual clients. 
 
2. Licensing and standards.  
Licensing and standards convey information about the quality of risk control. A bank 
                                                 
117 “NACHA Adopts Rules on Third-Party ACH Processing” (2004).  
118 A description of SAS 70 audits is available at www.sas70.com.  
119 Lemieux (2003), p. 19-21.       
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charter, for example, conveys information that the organization has in place a control regimen 
that addresses payments system risk. An extension of this technique would require all 
participants in payment processing to obtain a charter and be subject to regulation.
120 Risk could 
also be mitigated by setting standards that designate some minimal level of risk control in place 
for payment system participants.
121 Because of the crucial economic role of payment systems, 
some analysts have argued that any TSP that provides products and services to depository 
institutions “should be held to a higher standard of care or required to disclaim up front that its 
product is not configured to or otherwise appropriate” for the financial services industry.
122  
 
3. Capital standards.  
Standards that allocate capital to mitigate operational risk can be used to link bank capital 
to risk in payment activities.
123 This capital provides a cushion to absorb financial consequences 
of disruptions to the payments system. Critics have argued that measurement issues make this 
technique ineffective.
124 A major problem is the lack of data from which an empirical link 
between payment disruptions and resulting costs can be estimated to help guide decisions about 
capital allocations.
125 One cause of the lack of data is that payment participants have an incentive 
to keep information about operational disruptions secret in order to preserve their reputations for 
quality services. Organizations that collect this information in a fashion that preserves anonymity 
of payment providers, such as the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 
                                                 
120 Glaessner, Kellerman, and McNevin (2004), p. 26.  
121 Lemieux (2003), p. 14 
122 Glaessner, Kellerman, and McNevin (2002), p. x 
123 Lemieux (2003), p. 15 
124 Glaessner, Kellerman, and McNevin (2002), p. xi. 
125 For example, in a recent study that uses operational errors to estimate loss functions, only 1 percent of the 
observations involved disruptions to payments and settlement. See de Fontnouvelle, DeJesus-Rueff, Jordon, and 
Rosengren (2003).       
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can help to overcome this problem.
126 The measurement problem may be particularly difficult 
because capital allocation models have been aimed primarily at depository institutions and may 
be inapplicable to many nonbank payment system participants.  
 
4. Supervision and regulation. 
The fourth component of risk control in payment systems is supervision and regulation. 
The advantage to this approach is that it can directly accomplish well defined goals of public 
policy. In the case of nonbank TSPs, it generates information about risk control processes, 
imposes corrective measures when needed, and provides a vehicle to encourage best practices. A 
disadvantage is that expansion of TSP supervision is costly. In the aftermath of a 2005 security 
breach at the payments processor CardSystems Solutions, news stories reported the existence of 
roughly 500 processing companies.
127 At the end of 2004, federal supervisors examined 87 TSPs 
that provide payments services (Table 5). To cover all payments processors would require a 
significant expansion of resources devoted to TSP supervision at federal agencies.   
Thus the task of identifying TSPs that should be supervised is daunting. The FFIEC 
should be commended for implementing a program that prioritizes TSPs according to risk and 
encouraged to continue efforts to improve the program.  
The fact that some participants in the payments network are subject to supervision while 
others are not raises important public policy questions. Because they do not have the cushion 
supplied by the federal safety net, a significant breakdown or failure has greater potential for 
serious consequences if it occurs in a nonbank payment provider compared to if it occurs in a 
                                                 
126 Formed in 1999, the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS/ISAC, www.fsisac.com) 
provides a confidential mechanism for sharing information about security vulnerabilities and methods to correct 
them. Glaessner, Kellerman, and McNevin (2004, p. 26) propose that regulations be imposed that compel reporting 
of security breaches and operational disruptions.  
127 Dash (2005).  
129 Hoenig (2000).       
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bank-affiliated payment provider.
129  
Moreover, bank affiliation automatically subjects TSPs to the authority of federal 
depository institution supervisory agencies, while nonbank TSPs may or may not be subject to 
supervision. Some nonbank payment providers are ineligible for supervision because they are not 
in an outsourcing relation with a depository institution. Others are not in the supervision program 
because the detection and screening method used by supervisors is imperfect. Money 
transmitters in the U.S. have traditionally been regulated by the states, with little federal 
involvement. Critics have called for more strict regulation of money transmitters, alleging that 
extraordinary amounts of money flow through this channel and around banks.
130 All in all, some 
elements of the payments system are well supervised while others are not.
131  
Even if this uneven supervision and regulation program is acceptable from the point of 
view of payments system risk, it still raises the question about competition in the payments 
market. If the cost of supervision and regulation to a payments provider is greater than its 
benefit, then supervised payment providers are at a competitive disadvantage compared to 
unsupervised payment providers. Some payment participants may consider this unfair and it may 
cause some economic inefficiency by making it difficult for supervised TSPs to bring 
innovations to the market.  
There is some government participation in each of these four categories of techniques 
that control risk in retail payments. Private contracting and appropriate disclosure can offer a 
minimal level of government involvement. One important government responsibility is to 
                                                 
130 Glaessner, Kellerman, and McNevin (2002), pp. ix-x.  
131 Another issue is that nonbank service providers have some ability to influence the regulatory structure to which 
they are subject. For example, Concord EFS chose to be a financial holding company, which subjects it to umbrella 
supervision by the Federal Reserve, which allows an overall assessment of risk in its organization. By contrast, First 
Data Corporation is not a financial holding company. While FDC is subject to TSP supervision, and its subsidiary 
banks are supervised, Federal regulatory agencies do not have authority to assess the risk control environment of the 
overall organization.       
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determine the “rules of the game” in contracting, such as setting specific limits on the degree to 
which one party can disclaim liability. Similarly, government can require certain disclosures, as 
with U.S. securities law or consumer protection. Government involvement can also be through 
licensing and the setting of standards. Government licensing has the advantages of a potentially 
disinterested screening process as well as enforcement powers. Similarly, standards setting often 
occurs in the private market, but government can be involved when it has a vested interest or can 
improve the standards setting process, as with the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. Within the rules set by contract law, disclosure requirements, licensing processes 
and standards, the interactions between individuals in the market can take over to determine 
contracted interrelationships and terms of transactions.  
Both capital standards and supervision require a higher degree of government control. 
Capital standards are arguably less intrusive than supervision, especially when the standards are 
transparent, because businesses can have wide latitude in running there affairs within the 
confines of the standard.  
Policy that controls payments system risk should be active with each of these four 
components, but finding the optimal mix is challenging. Licensing implies restrictions on entry 
to the payments market, which may be anticompetitive. Setting standards at an inopportune time 
can stifle innovation. Payment participants should monitor their IT providers, but small banks 
have limited ability to do this, suggesting that there would be value in a central bank role in 
developing standards and infrastructure.
132 The practical difficulties of using capital regulation, 
and externalities that limit incentive of payment participants to invest in redundancy and security 
systems, argue for a legal structure with appropriate incentives and/or a significant role for 
                                                 
132 Lemieux (2003), pp. 16-17.       
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supervision and regulation.  
While these techniques can be used to control risk in retail payments, a reasonable 
criteria for selection is the degree to which they rely on market forces. Experience has shown 
that it is best to rely on market forces unless it is shown that (1) market forces are inadequate and 
(2) supervision and regulation can accomplish public policy goals at a reasonable cost.  
 
Information deficiencies and revisions to policies on payments system risk 
Whether the presence of nonbanks in the payments system and the trend towards 
electronic payments requires a significant change to the legal and regulatory structure 
surrounding payments depends on factors that are insufficiently documented. Before making 
specific recommendations, more facts relevant to the following questions would be useful:  
•  What is the nature of operational risk in payments processing? How many incidents 
are there? How costly have they been, including both costs borne by the payments 
industry and costs borne by users of payments services?
133  
•  How often have payments disruptions occurred at vendors that are outside of the TSP 
supervision program? How significant are these disruptions?  
•  To what extent do bank-TSP contracts disclaim TSP liability? Has this resulted in 
depository institutions being without recourse when disruptions occur at TSPs?  
•  How successful are institutional arrangements that facilitate the sharing of 
information on security and operational disruptions to payment systems?  
•  How effective are the information channels used by the TSP supervision program in 
informing the program about significant nonbank providers of payment services?  
                                                 
133 This could not only assist in determining policy but could also help the risk approach to examination by 
providing data on likelihood and costs of operational problems.       
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Lastly, the Bank for International Settlement’s Core Principles for Systemically 
Important Payment Systems states that the central bank should adopt methods to control risk in 
any payments system it operates and should have the ability to oversee compliance of risk 
control principles in payment systems it does not operate.
134 Primary authority for supervision of 
nonbank payment providers in the U.S. comes from the Bank Service Company Act. This Act 
was passed more than 40 years ago and reflects technology in service at that time. Since then 
there have been vast increases in the sophistication of technology applied in payments and 
significant changes in payment options. It seems reasonable to ask whether the Federal Reserve 
has adequate authority to oversee the entire payments system.  
A review of the exact authority for payments system oversight that the Federal Reserve 
has under current law would therefore be useful. This type of review would be particularly 
valuable in areas where risk exposure of payment participants arises from their interrelationships 
in a payments network. It should explicitly examine the extent of authority over nonbank 
participants in payments as well as limits to authority derived through supervisory 
responsibilities over depository institutions. Finally, the Federal Reserve may want to seek new 
authority if current authority is insufficient to ensure the safety, efficiency, and accessibility of 
the payments system.  
                                                 
134 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2001), p. 11.       
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Figure 1: Ownership of Top 20 Regional ATM Networks 
United States, 1985-2005 
 
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years). 
 




Notes: The break at 2002-2003 is due to different methods of calculating transaction volume. Prior to 2003, many 
ATM transactions were counted by more than one ATM network. As a result, measures of aggregate market share 
could be above 100 percent. Much of the double counting was eliminated for 2003 to 2005.   
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).      
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Table 1: U.S. Noncash Retail Payments, 2003 
 
 
  Check   
Debit and 
credit cards    ACH 
Volume (billions)  36.7    34.6    9.1 
Value (trillions)  $39.3     $2.3     $25.1  
Share of volume  45%    43%    11% 
Share of value  59%    3%    38% 
Average 
transaction value  $1071     $66     $2758  
           
 
Notes: Check estimates for Mar-Apr 2004 (annualized); cards and ACH estimates for the year 2003. 
 
Source: Federal Reserve System (2004).       
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Table 2: Trends in U.S. Noncash Retail Payments, 1995 to 2003 
 
 
         
 
   
Compound 
Annual Growth 
    1995    2000 
 
2003   
1995 to 
2000 
  2000 to 
2003 
Check  Volume (billions)  49.5  41.9 36.6  -3.3% -4.5%
  Share of Total  77.1%  57.8% 45.3%       
Electronic*  Volume (billions)  14.7  30.5 44.3  14.6% 12.4%
  Share of Total  22.9%  42.2% 54.7%       
Total    64.2  72.4 80.9 
   
 
 
*Debit card, credit card, and ACH transactions.  
 
Sources: Gerdes and Walton (2002, 2005).  
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Notes: Bank affiliation status is determined by a significant ownership position by one or more 
depository institution, whether run as corporations, limited partnerships or limited liability companies. 
An independent TSP has no significant ownership by a depository institution.  
 
        Bank affiliation status 
   
All 
TSPs    Nonbank   
Bank 
affiliated 
            
    Number of clients 
Median    16.5  25    9 
Minimum    1  1    1 
Maximum    21000  6000    21000 
            
    Number of business lines offered 
Median    4  4    4 
Minimum    1  1    1 
Maximum    16  16    16 
            
Total number 
 of TSPs    125  83    42      
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Table 4: Business Line Risk Categories 
for Evaluating Technology Service Providers 
 
 
Notes: Boldface indicates a payment service.  
 
Source: Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (2003b).  
 













Aggregation and other emerging 
technologies 
ATM/POS processing and 
switching 
Asset/liability management 
Credit card merchant 
processing 
Credit scoring 
Employee benefit account 
processing 
Loan and mortgage processing 
Investment processing 
Retail electronic banking / 
transactional Web site 
hosting 
Bill payment services 
Check processing 
Credit card issuance 
Imaging and electronic 
safekeeping 
Web site hosting 
(informational)    
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Table 5: Business Lines Offered by Supervised Technology Service Providers 
 
        Bank affiliation status    Supervision program 
  All TSPs    Nonbank   Bank affiliated   National    Regional 
Business Line  N  Percent   N  Percent    N  Percent    N  Percent    N  Percent 
Core processing  68 54.6%  37 44.6%  31 73.8%   7 43.8%  61 56.0%
Any payments-related business line*  87 69.6%  55 66.3%  32 76.2%   13 81.3%  74 67.9%
Other business line**  21 16.8%  19 22.9%  2 4.8%   2 12.5%  19 17.4%
                           
Total number of TSPs  125    83    42    16    109 
 
 
*ACH processing/services, ATM processing/services/network/switch, bill payment service, credit card issuance, credit and/or debit card merchant 
processing, credit card network/switch,  check processing, check processing software vendor clearing and settlement, POS 
processing/services/network/switch, and wholesale payments. 
**Retail e-banking/transactional Web site hosting, electronic record safekeeping, imaging, loan or mortgage processing/servicing, corporate e-
banking/cash management, Web site hosting (informational), disaster recovery, investment processing,  aggregation, asset/liability management, 
credit scoring, other emerging technologies, employee benefit account processing, asset management processing, bank image processor, debit card 
"services", Internet services, IRA "services", payroll "services", safe deposit, student loan processor, trust processing services, Visa "services". 
 
Notes: Many TSPs are double counted because they offer core processing, payments, and/or other business lines. As a result, the sum of the 
number of TSPs in each category is greater than the total number of TSPs, and the sum of percentages is greater than 100 percent. TSPs in the 
national supervision program are in the Multi-regional Data Processing Servicer (MDPS) examination program. Other supervised TSPs are in the 
regional program. Bank affiliation status is determined by a significant ownership position by one or more depository institution, whether run as 
corporations, limited partnerships or limited liability companies. An independent TSP has no significant ownership by a depository institution.  
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